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• Canada's experience with central banking
has unique features, but inﬂation
outcomes in the twentieth century were
also affected by global forces.
• Canada adopted central banking in the
1930s (relatively late) in response to the
economic and, more importantly, political
turmoil of the times.
• Following World War II, Canada was a
pioneer in ﬂoating the exchange rate, and
success encouraged broader international
acceptance of ﬂoating rates.
• Monetarism was an early weapon in the
attack on the inﬂation engendered by the
end of the Bretton Woods system in the
1970s, but had limited success.
• Since the early 1990s, "inﬂation targets"
have been seen as crucial to maintaining
low inﬂation.
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n 11 March 1935, the Bank of Canada
opened its doors. What did it see? An econ-
omy in turmoil and well-wishers from all
sides of the political and economic spec-
trum who believed the Bank could solve their prob-
lems. Did it? What did the Bank do? That is too large a
question for a 15-minute talk. We will leave aside
important questions about the Bank’s role in ﬁnancial
stability, currency management, and debt manage-
ment, focusing instead on the question of monetary
policy and, speciﬁcally, on the Bank’s contribution in
an international context: What did central banks in
general do over the past 70 years, and where was
Canada a notable innovator?
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a monetary
orthodoxy had been created, wherein a “developed”
country had a monetary unit defined as a given weight
of gold and a central bank that managed the note issue
and protected the value of the currency. These institu-
tions were challenged by World War I, and especially
the debts and reparations that lingered after the war,
but the system was more or less re-established in the
mid-1920s. By the early 1930s, the exigencies of the
Great Depression led many countries to abandon the
convertibility of their currency into gold, but this was
widely seen as a transitory phenomenon, and a return
to some link to gold was anticipated.
During World War II (what Temin [2002] and others
have called the later phase of the second Thirty Years’
War), exchange rates and foreign exchange—like
many other prices and quantities—were administered
by government fiat. At the conclusion of the war, at
the famous hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,
delegates from 44 countries designed a new interna-
tional monetary regime. They established the Interna-
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tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank;
countries would gradually open up their current
accounts, and currencies would become convertible;
theUnitedStates—whichhadinfactbannedtheholding
of gold by private individuals—would maintain the
convertibility of the dollar into gold at its traditional
parity, and other countries would simply maintain
convertibility of their currencies into U.S. dollars,
thereby creating indirect gold convertibility. The gold
standard that had provided a nominal anchor to the
monetary system from the 1880s to 1914 was re-estab-
lished, but the chain was now rather elastic (Redish
1993).
The Bretton Woods pact ﬁnally ended in 1973, when
the United States suspended the gold convertibility
of the dollar.1 The subsequent decade is known for
the “Great Inflation,” which, in Canada and the
United States, peaked at the end of the decade at
about 15 per cent (annualized). The early 1980s saw
aggressive disinﬂation in both countries, and inﬂation
rates have stabilized at around 2 per cent in the majority
of the G–7 countries since the last decade of the
twentieth century.
Where does the Bank of Canada fit into this story?
The behaviour of inflation is evidence of the important
background fact that there can’t be a completely idio-
1.   The United States was following an inﬂationary policy that was inconsist-
ent with the dollar being the central reserve currency. See Bordo (1993).
Chart 1
70 Years of Inﬂation
(12-month rate of change in the consumer price index, December)
Per cent























1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
U.S. inﬂation
syncratic Canadian story—inflation rates, at least,
performed more or less the same in Canada and the
United States (Chart 1).2 However, there can still be an
important role played by the Bank of Canada. Perhaps
the Bank managed to minimize the negative conse-
quences of inﬂation and disinﬂation for the Canadian
economy? Perhaps Canadian policy led U.S. policy?
Perhaps Canadian policy was implemented more efﬁ-
ciently? Again, we focus on only a piece of the answer,
on the half-dozen issues where Canada, for better or
worse, was slightly out of step with (ahead or
behind!) international experience:
• lack of a central bank in the early years
• the ﬂoating rate in the Bretton Woods
period
• the explicit monetarism of the mid-1970s
• the adoption of inﬂation targets in the early
1990s, and
• the implementation of monetary policy
with standing facilities in the 1990s.
The Establishment of the Central
Bank
The core Western countries operating on the gold
standard (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom)
all had central banks that held a monopoly over the
note issue and performed, to differing extents, such
functions as clearing house, lender of last resort, and
centra reserve depository. The gold standard, however,
operated as a nominal anchor that severely constrained
their ability to operate monetary policy.
Canada also held to the gold standard, but without a
central bank. Notes were issued by competing private
banks and, like central bank notes, were convertible
into gold on demand.3 The government did issue a
statutorily limited amount of notes in small-denomi-
nation (up to $5) notes, which constituted about
20 per cent of the note issue, and “large legals.”4
Both were legal tender and convertible into gold on
demand. The government also operated a discount
2.   The U.S. data are used because they are easy to ﬁnd; a more complete
graph would have inﬂation rates for all of the G–7 countries, but the picture
would be broadly the same.
3. More correctly, they were converted into legal tender, which included gold
coin and Dominion notes (see below).
4.  Large legals were Dominion notes in large denominations that were only
legal tender between banks and were therefore ”theft-proof” and superior to
gold as a means of handling reserves. Data for 1913 (McIvor 1958, 67).9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2005–2006
window at which the banks could borrow Dominion
notes. The association of the chartered banks—the
Canadian Bankers’ Association (CBA)—operated the
clearing house. While attempts to establish a central
bank had been made at various times in Canadian
history, the system appeared to function relatively
well. So why create a central bank in 1934?
In a previous paper (Bordo and Redish 1987), we
argue that the primary reason was political expediency.
A variety of constituencies were in favour of a central
bank: Western populists wanted to take the power to
create money out of the grubby profit-maximizing
hands of eastern banks; others believed that a central
bank would remove the potential power of money
creation from the greedy hands of government. Aca-
demic economists argued that a central bank would
“manage the currency and credit in the best interests
of the Canadian economy” and would provide impartial
economic advice to the government, as well as facili-
tating greater international co-operation and policy
coordination (McIvor 1958, 144).
Ironically, one of the strongest arguments traditionally
adduced for central banks—that they can be a necessary
lender of last resort—was substantially weakened in
the early 1930s when one-third of U.S. banks failed,
while no Canadian bank did.5 The CBA argued against
the establishment of a central bank on the grounds
that note issue by the private (chartered) banks cre-
ated elasticity in the money supply that enabled the
Canadian system to handle shocks particularly well.
The Bank of Canada was established
to satisfy a political desire for
government action during the most
serious business-cycle downturn
Canada had experienced.
Perhaps the critical argument for a Canadian central
bank was “national pride.” The 1930s was generally
a decade of assertive nationalism: the founding of
Trans-Canada Airlines (forerunner of Air Canada), the
creation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
(CBC), and the passing of the Statute of Westminster
5. We note, however, the argument of Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993) that it
is unclear whether this reﬂected ﬁnancial soundness or regulatory forbear-
ance.
were three other features of this time. At two major
international conferences designed to restore and main-
tain the international ﬁnancial system, the Interna-
tional Financial Conference in Brussels in 1931 and
the World Economic Conference in 1933, the major
powers called on all developed economies to estab-
lish a central bank to provide the tools for interna-
tional coordination. Finally, Prime Minister Bennett,
speaking in 1933, declared that he had in fact decided
in December 1931 to establish a central bank:
I learned to my surprise that there was no
direct means of settling international bal-
ances between Canada and London, that the
only medium was New York, and the value
of the Canadian dollar would have to be
determined in Wall Street. I made up my
mind then and there that this country was
going to have a central bank (Stokes 1939, 65).
The Bank of Canada, then, was established to satisfy a
political desire for government action during the most
serious business-cycle downturn Canada had experi-
enced. The Bank expected that the gold standard
would be re-established, perhaps in an environment
of greater international coordination.6
Floating in a Sea of Fixed Currencies
Canada had been an enthusiastic contributor to the
Articles of Agreement that established the IMF.
Canadian ofﬁcials had argued that Canada would be a
definite beneficiary if a stable system of exchange
rates were established after World War II, rather than
returning to the somewhat chaotic exchange rate system
of the late 1930s, when some currencies were incon-
vertible and payments were cleared bilaterally rather
than multilaterally.
The Canadian dollar was ﬁxed against the U.S. dollar
during the war, and in July 1946, was revalued to parity
against the U.S. dollar (Chart 2). In late 1949, Canada
joined Britain and a number of other countries in
devaluing against the dollar, returning to the wartime
rate of 90 cents. But through 1950, capital inﬂows gen-
erated by investment opportunities in the resource
sector, and accelerated by the onset of the Korean War,
led to a signiﬁcant increase in international reserves.
This in turn encouraged speculation that Canada
would revalue, generating short-term capital inﬂow;
6.  The Bank of Canada Act required that notes be convertible into gold on
demand, with the provision that the government could suspend convertibil-
ity if it so desired, which it immediately did.10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2005–2006
1930s. Speculation would tend to be stabilizing rather
than destabilizing.
Canadian experience showed that
ﬂexible rates would not necessarily
bring the competitive devaluations
and currency chaos of the 1930s.
Speculation would tend to be
stabilizing rather than destabilizing.
With hindsight, there are a couple of caveats: (a) Canada
was a small open economy, and (b) was operating in
a larger world that had maintained its nominal anchor.
The first didn’t require hindsight! Writing in 1935,
Lionel Robbins had stated “While it may be quite pos-
sible, and not necessarily very harmful to the rest of
the world, for small countries acting in isolation to
attempt to solve their local problems by such expedients
[i.e., ﬂexible exchange rates], their general adoption in
the big financial centres can only lead to perpetual
confusion and instability” (cited in Wonnacott 1960, 21).
Without necessarily buying into the second half of this
statement, we can note that what works for a small
open economy may not work for a global system.
Extending this argument, it is critical to contextualize
the Canadian experience. We now know that having
a nominal anchor is a key ingredient for successful
monetary regimes. The Canadian experience, which
was emphasized as being transitory in nature, and
whichoccurredinaworldwheretheleadingcurrencies
were attached (albeit loosely) to gold, was not able to
provide evidence about the need for a nominal anchor.
Thus, when flexible rates were widely adopted in the
1970s, it took time to develop monetary stability.
Monetarism
The 1970s have become known as the decade of the
“Great Inflation,” and Canada, like many other coun-
tries, including the United Kingdom and the United
States, experienced unprecedentedly high rates of
inﬂation. Today, the causes and sources of the inﬂation
are hotly debated, with blame being variously attrib-
utedtooilshocks,poordata,orpooreconomicmodels.
In 1975, the rate of inﬂation in the Canadian consumer
price index (CPI) hit 14 per cent, and the Canadian
government responded. The government adopted
in October 1950, the decision was made to float the
dollar. The Minister of Finance (speaking in 1952)
stated that, “No one could decide with any reasonable
assurance what new ﬁxed rate could be maintained.
We had no choice but to leave the rate free to ﬁnd its
own level in the market” (cited in Wonnacott 1960, 58).
The decision to ﬂoat the currency in the absence of
either ﬁscal exigency or ﬁnancial crisis was possibly
without precedent. The government argued—at least
as rhetoric for allaying the concerns of the IMF—that
the float was a transitory adjustment mechanism
rather than the permanent adoption of a ﬁat money
currency.
Surprisingly to some, the float itself was relatively
tranquil—at least for the ﬁrst decade. The Canadian
dollar appreciated and by mid-1952 was at a 4 per cent
premium relative to the U.S. dollar. It remained in the
$1 to $1.05 range through the 1950s before depreciating
well below parity with the onset of the Coyne Affair in
1961. In that traumatic event in Canadian monetary
history,theMinisterofFinancerequestedtheresignation
of James Coyne, Governor of the Bank since 1955.
Coyne initially refused, but resigned six weeks later,
after a government bill declaring the governorship
vacant was defeated in the Senate. The stability of the
currency in the 1950s became a key data point in the
debate over fixed vs. flexible exchange rates that
ragedinthelate‘60sandearly‘70s.Advocatesofflexible
rates argued that the Canadian experience showed
that flexible rates would not necessarily bring the
competitive devaluations and currency chaos of the
Chart 2
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wage and price controls, and the Bank adopted mone-
tarism as an anti-inﬂation policy. Monetarism in its
purest form is associated with the k per cent rule
proposed by Friedman (1960). He argued that the
combination of the lags in policy-making, the imper-
fect information available to policy-makers, and the
potential expediency of policy implied that countries
should adopt constitutional amendments that
required a monetary aggregate to grow at a fixed
rate annually, that rate being something like 5 per
cent.7
The end of the Bretton Woods system led many coun-
tries to search for a nominal anchor—a clear target for
monetary policy — and as inflation rose, many adopted
variants of this monetarist prescription. The Bundes-
bank targeted reserves; the Bank of England targeted
sterling M3; the Bank of Japan announced forecasts for
M2 beginning in 1978 (Bernanke and Mishkin 1992).
In the United States, the Federal Reserve announced
targets for three monetary aggregates, but appeared to
be more interested in monitoring monetary growth
than targeting it. Bernanke and Mishkin argue that
Fed policy was not particularly restricted by mone-
tary targets before Volcker’s announcement of a
new commitment to combatting inﬂation in October
1979.8 The Bank of Canada targeted M1 and chose a
gradualist approach, starting with a target growth range
for M1 of 10 to 15 per cent, and then over time lowering
the range to 8 to 12 per cent and then 4 to 8 per cent.
Relative to the Fed, the Bank was much more commit-
ted to the monetarist rhetoric, at least in the ‘70s.9
But the monetarist experiment was not a success.
After an initial pause, undoubtedly helped by wage and
price controls, inflation returned to double-digit levels,
despiteagrowthrateofM1thatwaslessthanthetarget
rates for most of the 1975 to 1980 period. Essentially,
a potent combination of very high nominal interest
rates, reflecting inflationary expectations, and the
diffusion of computing power dramatically reduced
the demand for demand deposits.10 Households
switched from demand deposits to daily-interest
chequing accounts (which legally allowed the banks
7.   That is, a rate that if accompanied by real growth of 3 per cent per year
and a fall in velocity of 2 per cent per year would yield price stability.
8.   Paul Volcker became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in August
1979.
9. See Bernanke and Mishkin’s conclusion that the rather haphazard schedule
for announcing new targets, and their base periods, implied a lack of commit-
ment.
10. Freedman (1983, 103) notes that “Unlike the situation in the United States,
deregulation played absolutely no role in the developments in either the
household or the corporate sector.” See also Courchene (1983, 37–51).
to claim “notice” of withdrawals so were not demand
deposits), while ﬁrms used sweeps to minimize their
overnight balances.11
In November 1982, arguing that “the targets abandoned
us,” the Bank officially ended M1 targeting. Yet Chart 1
shows that, by 1983, inflation had been, if not van-
quished, at least brought under control. What ended
the Great Inﬂation of the 1970s? There was no clear
replacement for the policy target, and indeed there
would be no new paradigm until the introduction of
inflation-targeting in the early 1990s. The general
consensus is that the Bank of Canada piggybacked on
the U.S. anti-inﬂation policies by adopting an implicit
exchange rate target. As the United States raised interest
rates, and the U.S. dollar appreciated, Canada chose to
follow U.S. rates up. The result was a negative rate of
real money growth (M2), a 4 per cent decline in real
gross domestic product (GDP), and a fall in inﬂation
from 12.5 per cent in 1981 to 5.8 per cent in 1983.
Inﬂation Targets
In February 1991, the Minister of Finance and the
Bank of Canada jointly announced that the Bank
would target the CPI inflation rate.12 At the time, the
inflation rate was close to 6 per cent, and an initial
target of 3 per cent for the end of 1992 (to be gradu-
ally reduced to 2 per cent by 1995) was announced.
Inflation targeting has been broadly successful.
Whereas in past decades monetary policy has been
controversial and has generated heated debate in the
literature, today, there is broad acceptance—possibly
disinterest—amongst Canadians about the conduct of
monetary policy.
Ironically, it was Governor Bouey who (in 1982) spoke
of “ﬁnding a place to stand,” because that is precisely
what inﬂation targeting has provided. But it is impor-
tant to remember what inﬂation targeting isn’t. Inﬂa-
tion targets are not necessary to cause disinﬂation, or
even to stabilize inﬂation; as noted earlier, the United
States has a similar inflation history without explicit
inflation targets. Inflation targets were not involved
either in the end of the Great Inflation of the ‘70s, a
much more critical anti-inflation step. Nor is there
much evidence that they made the decline in inﬂation
less expensive in terms of unemployment (Laidler
andRobson1993,137).Itshouldalsobeemphasized—as
11.  The differential reserve requirements (3 per cent for notice deposits,
10 per cent for demand deposits) were undoubtedly a factor in the banks’
strategy. See Courchene (1983, 44).
12.   The Bank of Canada was not the ﬁrst central bank to adopt inﬂation
targets.  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand adopted them in March 1990.12 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2005–2006
the Bank has on many occasions—that inﬂation target-
ing is not inconsistent with a concern for employment
(as required by the Bank of Canada Act).
What is inﬂation targeting? As conducted in Canada,
it is an explicit commitment by the Bank of Canada to
orient policy to attain a particular rate of growth of the
CPI, currently 2 per cent. The tools that the Bank uses
to attempt to attain that goal include (a) using a pro-
jection model to determine what overnight interest
rate would be consistent with a 2 per cent inflation
rate within 8 quarters, and setting the target for the
overnight rate at that level,13 and (b) a communica-
tions strategy. There was a dramatic change in the
transparency of monetary policy between 1994 and
2000. This is probably most starkly put by noting that,
in 1994, individuals in the economy had to guess that
the Bank had changed its monetary policy stance—
there was no announcement. For example, Laidler and
Robson (1993, 77) describe how “students of the Bank
of Canada’s actions” may want to look at the spread
“between overnight rates and the yields on such
money market securities as T-bills” as an indicator
of the stance of monetary policy. There were no
announcements; there was no Monetary Policy Report
(MPR); the market would learn that the Bank’s policy
had changed because the Bank was intervening at a
different rate than yesterday morning.
At the beginning of the twentieth
century, the gold standard provided a
nominal anchor for the monetary
system . . . [but it] was an anchor that
could shift arbitrarily and that
imposed real resource costs; ﬁat
money avoids these disadvantages.
Have we come full circle? Have we just switched
anchors? At the beginning of the twentieth century,
the gold standard provided a nominal anchor for the
monetary system, and central banks were seen as
handmaidens to the gold standard, which could
ease necessary adjustments and facilitate international
co-operation. There is a broad congruence—inﬂation
13. In the language of Courchene (1976), the instrument of monetary policy is
the overnight rate, and the intermediate target is the forecast of the inﬂation
rate.
targets provide a visible, comprehensible characteriza-
tion of the monetary regime—but there are deﬁnite
limits to the parallels.
• The gold standard evolved over centuries,
and its credibility reﬂected that history.
• The gold standard was, in an important
way, an automatic system; inﬂation targets
require greater skill.
• The gold standard was closer to a price
level than inﬂation targets, since it did not
incorporate base drift.
• Most signiﬁcantly, the gold standard was
an anchor that could shift arbitrarily (with
gold discoveries or any changes in demand
and supply to gold), and that imposed real
resource costs; ﬁat money avoids these dis-
advantages.
Implementation of Monetary Policy
Using Standing Facilities
The mechanisms for implementing monetary policy
have evolved gradually over the decades, but the
changes in the 1990s were sufﬁciently important that
they merit special mention. These changes include:
• the phase-out of reserve requirements
(1992–94)14
• the shift from focusing on the 3-month
treasury bill rate to setting a 50-basis-point
(bp) range for the overnight rate (mid-’94),
implemented by manipulating the supply
of settlement balances using changes in the
amount of government funds on deposit
and open-market operations
• ﬁrst issue of the MPR (May 1995)
• setting the Bank Rate as the top of the target
range for the overnight rate (rather than
having it tied to the T-bill rate) and issuing
press releases to announce changes in the
target (February 1996)
• introduction of the Large Value Transfer
System (LVTS) in February 1999 (see below)
• introduction of “fixed dates “ for announcing
monetary policy decisions (December 2000).
14.   This change—the reduction of the required reserve ratio to zero—was
less radical than it might appear. By the mid-1990s, the high demand for cur-
rency to stock automated teller machines, which also, of course, could be used
to satisfy reserve requirements, combined with the stagnant demand for
demand deposits, meant that the existing ratio was barely binding.13 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2005–2006
In the 1990s, the majority of large economies moved
from a deferred net settlement system to a real-time
gross settlement system, primarily to give real-time
ﬁnality to large payments and to reduce systemic risk.
In Canada, the LVTS came on-line in 1999, and at the
same time the Bank also began paying interest on
settlement balances.  Direct clearers (mainly the large
banks and non-bank financial institutions) now operate
in an environment where the Bank provides (a) an
infinitely elastic supply of settlement balances (collat-
eralized) at the Bank Rate (deﬁned as 25 bp above the
target for the overnight rate), and (b) an infinitely elas-
tic demand for deposits paying interest at the target
overnight rate less 25 bp.  The spread (which far
exceeds the bid-ask spread on overnight loans of about
10 to12 bp) is wide enough to encourage participants
to use the market for overnight funds rather then the
Bank’s facilities.15
The net effect of the elimination of reserve requirements,
the introduction of the LVTS, and the establishment of
standing facilities for overdrafts and deposits has been
to streamline the operation of monetary policy. The
overnight rate stays very close to the target—far closer
than in the United States for example (Woodford
2000), and the reserve tax that led to a distortionary
wedge between financial institutions (banks and others)
and between different liabilities of the same institution
(demand deposits and notice deposits) has been
eliminated.
Conclusion
The Bank of Canada has been in operation for just
over 70 years and has seen dramatic changes in the
Canadian economy, in the structure of international
ﬁnance, and in the nature of money. The change in the
balance sheet of the Bank between March 1935 and
March 2005 (Table 1) highlights some of the changes: the
absence of gold on the asset side and the absence of
bank reserves—or today’s equivalent, deposits made
by members of the Canadian Payments Association
(CPA)16— on the liability side. Yet, as noted earlier,
there is also remarkable continuity in its mission.
The current monetary situation would appear to be as
calm as any that the Bank has experienced, but we
15.  On a typical day, the average overnight rate is quite close to target, and
use of the two facilities is limited.
16. CPA member deposits were less then $1 billion in 2005.
should beware of complacency. The history of the Bank
is one of being buffeted by both sharp crises and
slower-moving evolutionary forces. One hundred
years ago, in 1905, the gold standard was working
smoothly, and the Canadian economy growing robustly.
But the ﬁnancial crisis of 1907, and the cataclysm of
1914, were not far distant. It is, of course, difﬁcult to
foresee the particular direction from which threats to
the stability of the monetary system may come, but
that they will come cannot be in doubt.
It is difﬁcult to foresee the particular
direction from which threats to the
stability of the monetary system may
come, but that they will come cannot
be in doubt.
In the meantime, the environment in which the Bank
operates continues to evolve, and the forces of globali-
zation and technological change (and the nature of the
state), which have driven the evolution of central








Notes in circulation 45
Notes in chartered banks 51
Bank deposits 149





Balance Sheet of the Bank of Canada
March 1935 March 2005
$ millions $ billions
Note: The ratio of Bank of Canada assets to gross domestic product was 6 per cent in 1935,
and 3 per cent in 2004.
Source: Bank of Canada Statistical Summary, and Bank of Canada website14 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2005–2006
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